Abstract: Backbone networks must be highly reliable. The offered availability can be predicted prior to operation if the stochastic behaviour of network components is known. The aim of this paper is provide information about failures and repairs processes in an operational network. Operational logs from UNINETT's core network were analysed to obtain distributions of the time between failures and downtimes of routers and links. The network components were classified according to their role in the network. The measured processes were fit with well-known distributions. The inter-failure times of routers and short distance links may be characterised by a Weibull distribution, but for the long distance links the gamma distribution yielded a better characterisation. The difference is discussed based on the hazard function. The parameters of each network component are made available and provide a detailed insight that may be used for dependability predictions and research.
Introduction
The design of highly dependable backbone networks has gain a lot of importance during recent years. Users, companies and society as a whole become increasingly more dependent on the services carried by these networks.
Due to their high capacity, million of users may be affected by a single failure, generating economic and reputation impact to the operator and incalculable consequences to their customer due to the affected services. This and the fact that real world networks are not fault free, makes a guarantee availability, as well as other dependability attributes, salient parameters inside a business contract known as service level agreement (SLA) between a network operator and the buyer of his services.
Several studies have aimed at providing tools for an adequate SLA definition. Gonzalez and Helvik (2010) proposed an algorithm that allocates end-to-end connections in network's links with assumed steady state availabilities, fulfilling bandwidth and availability requirements. Other works on SLA assessment assume Markovian failure and repair processes for mathematical convenience or due to the lack detailed of real-life data (Finkelstein and Zarudnij, 2002; Mykkeltveit and Helvik, 2009) . However, as shown in Gonzalez and Helvik (2009) , the actual failure and repair processes (e.g., Weibull distributed time between failures instead of exponential) has a major impact on the probability of meeting a specified SLA target for the interval availability. Hence, the importance of having information about the real behaviour of failure and repair processes.
This paper analyses operational data and is focused on describing dependability characteristics of the elements of an IP backbone network, i.e., appropriate distributions of time between failures for the different types of elements identified and availability parameters. The investigation is based on logged failures made available by the Norwegian academic network operator UNINETT (2011a) . The results shown in this paper are based on measurements made from January 2008 to December 2009, a period where the network did not undergo relevant changes neither in topology nor in supporting layer 2 infrastructure.
Previous works provide substantial information of the dependability in operational access networks (Choi et al., 2007; Matz et al., 2002) . On the other hand, studies on backbone networks (Iannaccone et al., 2002; Markopoulou et al., 2008) normalise the published values due to commercial restrictions. This paper publishes explicit parameters of the failure processes in an operational backbone network. It proposes an original device classification that fits the dependability properties of network's elements. Finally, it develops a hazard analysis of the characterised processes, helping to the better understanding of the obtained results and offering a physical interpretation of the studied processes.
We classify the network devices according to their dependability features, obtaining four different groups. In addition, we evaluate availability values and failure intensities in order to identify the differences and similarities among the defined groups and to have an initial understanding of the dependability behaviour of the UNINETT network. Based on the obtained results we found that assuming perfect routers (which is a common policy) is not valid.
An important objective in this paper is to fit the observed processes with well-known distributions that may allow their easy replication in other studies. There are many procedures in order to have trustable fit of measured data. Initially, we apply quantile-quantile plots (Q-Q plots) to have a visual and intuitive evaluation. In addition, we use the method of maximum likelihood to estimate specific distribution's parameters. Finally, we run tests that evaluate whether a dataset is well-modelled or not by the estimated distributions. Given that fitting procedures are common in many experimental analysis, in Cirrone et al. (2004) and Mascialino et al. (2006) a statistical toolkit that tries to standardise this procedures is presented.
We found that the failure processes in short and long distance links have different features. We show that the Weibull distribution traditionally used for modelling link failures processes is not accurate for the case of long distance fibres. In this case, the gamma distribution is a better option. We use the concept of failure rate (hazard function) in order to explain the found difference.
This paper is organised as follows. Previous works are briefly reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the UNINETT's IP backbone network, the data collection method and the information used for the analysis. In Section 4 element failure intensity and unavailability are analysed, and routers, short (intrasite), medium (regional) and long (intercity) links are identified as types of elements having differing characteristics. Section 5 outlines the techniques used to fit distributions to data, analyses the obtained results by using of cumulative distribution and hazard functions and presents the fitted parameter values for all elements. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Previous work
In spite of the importance of using realistic failure processes and component's parameter values for network availability dimensioning, the access to such information is limited. This is due to a number of reasons, among them that failures of their network are not what operators like to have exposed in a competitive commercial marketplace. However, there have been some recent studies on operational failure data giving valuable insights. In Choi et al. (2007) , a study of spatial and temporal failures and outages in an access network was performed to assess availability. Another study in Matz et al. (2002) estimates the time between failures and times to repair for elements in a large wireless access network, finding that they are not consistent with exponential distributions, but they may better be described by Weibull or two-stage hyper-exponential distributions. A study of the failure behaviour in an operational backbone network is reported by Iannaccone et al. (2002) . They examine the frequency and duration of failure events and discuss various statistics, like the distribution of inter-failure times and the distribution of link failure durations, nevertheless some information is missed given that for proprietary reasons they normalised the published values. This work was continued in Markopoulou et al. (2008) , where failures and repairs in the Sprint IP backbone network are classified and analysed. They perform a characterisation of the different classes of failures found. Verbrugge et al. (2005) present expected values of the mean time between failures (MTBF) and mean time to repair (MTTR), collected from several network equipment and design a model to perform end-to-end availability studies. In Kuusela et al. (2009) , Kuusela and Norros analyse router failure logs from the Finnish academic network, FUNET and in Kuusela and Norros (2010) they describe a method that can be used to assess downtimes due to joint failures.
UNINETT network description
UNINETT is the network that connects universities, colleges and research institutions in Norway. It is a non-profit organisation giving us the opportunity to publish dependability related information without commercial restrictions. UNINETT provides service to several hundred thousand users, carrying many critical applications. Hence, availability is a major concern and is reflected in a core network topology with a highly redundant design, cf. Figure 1 . The core of the network interconnects the main Norwegian cities through optical fibre connections of 10 and 2.5 gigabit per second (Gbps). Full details about the UNINETT topology can be found in UNINETT (2011b) . The studied backbone is operated using WDM technology and several brands of routers. IS-IS is used for intradomain routing. In this paper, we are interested in analysing dependability features of the core network. Hence, we have selected the subset of connections considered by UNINETT as the backbone. They are at the same time the connections that interconnect the main cities in Norway as is shown in Figure 1 . The failure and repair processes of the routers and links shown in this figure will be analysed in the next chapters.
The failure logs were obtained by a network management system, recording all events at the IP layer. Logs are available since January 2001, however, the data that will be used in this paper stems from January 2008 to December 2009. The reason for choosing this period is that the core network did not undergo any relevant changes, neither of the topology, nor of the routers and links, which makes it likely that the processes are stationary and uninterrupted.
Router's and link's failures are registered with a precision of seconds. The data collection method follows SNMP standards, where for each new component installed SNMP agents enable the detection of changes in the network operation. Those changes may be identified either by periodical polling, using GetRequest/GetResponse messages generated from the central server, or by trapping techniques generated on the remote agent that uses notification messages able to capture every change online. Events that imply the whole router are identified by 'no-response/reachable' messages, while link failures are reported on specific router interfaces by 'linkUp/linkDown' messages. In case of a router failure, the network management platform does not register all the individual down events of each router interface/link.
The information provided by UNINETT contains summaries of events based on raw SNMP data without any previous processing. In addition, the information about some events may be replicated. Therefore, a set of PERL scripts were implemented to obtain clean on-off processes for each network component. The obtained processes were verified using alternatives means such as traffic logs and UNINETT customer relationship management (CRM) information. Additional information about the UNINETT operations may be found in UNINETT (2011a).
Availability of network components
This section regards failure intensities and unavailability of network elements. The elements analysed are those shown in Figure 1 and the observation period, τ, is from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009.
The following notation is used. Failure and repair events of N network components are analysed. Each element i (i = 1, 2, …, N) has an operational state that may be described by an on-off process as illustrated in Figure 2 . Failure j (j = 1, 2, .., n i ) of element i occurs at time t i,j , where the downtime duration is denoted by d i,j and n i is the total number of failures of device i during τ. After a repair, the time when the device is working properly before a new failure occurs will be defined as uptime and will be denoted as Network components are classified according to their role in the network, which determines their exposure for externally induced faults and operating conditions. Four different groups G x (x = 1, 2, 3, 4) are identified as shown in the Table 1. All routers have roughly the same role and operating conditions. Short distance links interconnect routers located in the same data centre (i.e., site). This means that they are short in their physical extent, they have an uncomplicated layer 2 and they are less exposed to environmental stress. Therefore, they are mainly affected by synchronisation problems, electrical fluctuations, human failures and similar incidents occurring within a controlled access domain. Most failures, also physical impairments, are relatively easily rectified. Medium distance links connect routers located at different sites in the same city. Most of the threats that affect short distance links also apply for medium distance links. However, the layer 2 handling the links is often more complex, the environmental exposure to weather or civil engineering activities, (e.g., diggers) are larger. Finally, long distance links, connecting cities hundreds of kilometres apart, are provided by layer 2 optical fibre infrastructures leased from other operators. Typically, these fibres are spun on electrical power lines and located in ditches along the railways. They are exposed to a bigger number of threats giving the large number of variables implied in the wide areas covered. The average number of failures per network element, ˆx W for G x is obtained as:
where M x is the total number of elements that belong to G x . Figure 3 shows ˆx W for the groups on Table 1, during the observation period τ and may be interpreted as failures per τ. It is seen that the number of failures in long distance links is approximately 15 times higher than in routers and short distance links and five times higher than in medium distance links. This difference was expected from the discussion above. At the same time, medium distance links present approximately four times more failures than routers and intra-site links. Note also that devices from group G 1 and G 2 have similar average number of failures. Hence, the common assumption that routers are (unconditionally) more reliable than links and may be assumed to be failure free is not entirely true.
On the other hand, we will also analyse availability levels on routers and links during the observation period τ.
The observed unavailability ˆ( ) i U τ in a single component i will be calculated as follows:
Based on the classification made on Table 1 , we compute the average unavailability per group G x as indicates the next equation:
(3) Figure 4 shows the obtained values of ˆ( ).
x U τ We may say that the average cumulative downtime of short distance links and routers during τ is in the order of minutes, for medium distance links is around 3 hours and for long distance links is approximately two days. The difference between routers and long distance links is approximately of two orders of magnitude, therefore we may say that the perfect routers assumption mentioned before, would be relatively valid in the study of a network with only these two kinds of components. The ratio between ˆx U and ˆx W shows that links have more difficult repair processes than routers even for the case of short distance links. In Figure 5 , we computed the average up/down time on each of the links and plot them against the physical length of the fibre. These results not only show the explicit values for mean up/down times but also describe two tendencies: First, the mean uptime is worse (decrease) with distance, second, the mean downtime is better (shorter) when the links are shorter. Figure 5 shows that the unavailability increase observed in long distance links is due to both; failure and repair process. Figure 6 shows the results of applying (4) on the UNINETT network's links. An important observation is that some links present high ρ values on all kind of links (intrasite, regional, intercity). With the information at hand was not possible to observe additional patterns; however, the message of Figure 6 is that up and downtime processes are not always independent.
The average failure intensity, the average unavailability and the mean up/down times provide a first insight of the network dependability analysed. In the next section, we will show additional information about the stochastic features of the failure and repair processes.
Time distributions
This section shows stochastic characteristics of the UNINETT's network components through the estimation of up/down time distributions. First, we describe the fitting techniques used for estimate parameters distributions. Then, we show and explain the obtained values.
Distribution fitting and goodness of fit
In order to know if parameterised distributions may be used to model the failure/repair processes of the UNINETT network, we use initially Q-Q plots. In this visual tool, the pattern of points is used to compare two distributions. When the deviation between the two patterns is not considerable, we may assume that the empirical data fits the hypothesised distribution. Using the information obtained from the Q-Q plots, we apply the method of maximum likelihood estimation in order to obtain parameters that may fit the hypothesised theoretical distribution. We obtain 95% confidence intervals and evaluate if the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) does not lie beyond them.
The obtained parameters of the hypothesised CDF may be tested through the use of well known goodness-of-fit test e.g., Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Camer-von Mises and Anderson Darling. Woodruff et al. (1984) analysed how to apply those tests on gamma distributions and in Shimokawa and Liao (1999) on Weibull distributions.
Given that this kind of procedures are widely used by the scientific community, the NIST has developed in cooperation with other institutions a handbook NIST/SEMATECH (2011) that tries to standardise many related issues. We use these standards and tools such as MATLAB and Wolfram-Mathematica in order to obtain and verify results.
Uptime fitting
Based on previous studies (Matz et al., 2002; Markopoulou et al., 2008) , we are interested in verify if the failure processes of the components that belong to the UNINETT core network may be modelled by a Weibull distribution. The probability density function (PDF) of this distribution will be defined as
where θ is the scale parameter in time units (e.g., seconds) and β the shape parameter (It is seen that when β = 1 the distribution becomes exponential). We use the filtered on-off processes and apply the procedures explained in 5.1 in order to verify if the Weibull distribution may be used to model uptimes. In Figure 7 , we provide an example that describes the typical behaviour observed when a CDF-fit is performed on uptimes of routers, short and medium distance links. This figure shows maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) for a gamma and a Weibull distribution with respective confidence bounds of 95%. It can be noticed that the empirical CDF lies out of the upper bound of the gamma-fit for uptime values around 0.1 × 10 7 seconds. This observation shows the low accuracy of the gamma-fit and the convenience of the Weibull-fit. We verify this result by using goodness-of-fit tests, probing that uptimes of devices that belong to G 1 , G 2 and G 3 are well described by a Weibull distribution.
The fitted parameters are shown in Table 2 for the case of links. We notice that the shape parameters (β) are less than 1 for all the cases and the scale parameters (θ) are usually bigger than one month. Table 3 shows the fitted parameters for the case of routers with enough number of samples in order to obtain trustable results and satisfy the goodness-of-fit test. The Weibull-fit does not seem to be valid for links that interconnect far located cities. We found that the use of gamma distributions is a better alternative. Here, we show the procedures that helped us to get this conclusion.
The notation used for the PDF of the gamma distribution is:
where λ is the scale parameter in time units and α the shape parameter. In order to show the difference with the Weibull-fit, Figure 8 shows the typical result obtained when a CDF-fit is performed for uptimes on links that interconnect far located cities (G 4 ). This figure also uses MLEs with confidence intervals of 95%. In this case, we observe how the empirical CDF lies out of the lower confidence bound of the Weibull-fit for uptime values around 0.5 × 10 6 seconds. We also performed goodness-of-fit tests that confirm that uptimes of long distance links may be characterised by a gamma distribution.
The estimated parameters are shown explicitly in Table 4 . The values shown are based on (6). We observe that the shape parameters (α) are smaller than the obtained on the Weibull-fit, indicating a higher burstiness in the failure processes.
Differences between the Weibull and gamma processes
We will study the theoretical differences between the gamma and the Weibull distributions in order to get an explanation of the results shown above. The Weibull and gamma distributions may be used to model monotonically increasing or decreasing failure rates, also known as hazard function h(t). It describes the probability per time unit that a system fails during a short interval after having been operational without failure up to time t.
The failure rate function of the Weibull and the gamma distribution are described by the following equations Sheikh et al. (1987) :
• For Gamma:
h g (t) involves the incomplete gamma function. Alternative techniques can also be used to model it. For instance, in Huzurbazar and Huzurbazar (1999) is proposed the use of the saddlepoint approximation in order to compute 'relatively straightforward' h g (t) . Figure 9 shows the hazard function of a gamma and a Weibull distribution with scale parameter of 46 days and shape parameter equal to 0.5 in both cases.
The main difference between the gamma and the Weibull distribution lies on the fact that the failure rate function of the gamma distribution gets stable and tends to a constant value for big uptimes, contrary to the Weibull distribution where for shape parameters bigger than one the failure rate always increase up to infinity and for values of β shorter than 1 decrease monotonically to 0.
In order to have a better illustration of the results observed in Figures 7 and 8 , we make a fit using the cumulative hazard function (CHF), which is the accumulation of the failure rate over time defined as follows:
In Figure 10 , we show the typical behaviour observed when a CHF-fit is performed for uptimes on devices that belongs to G 1 , G 2 and G 3 . The Weibull-fit shows a CHF with a big increase at the beginning of the curve, for short uptime values that gradually reduce the increase rate up to 0 (dH W (t) / dt → 0) for big uptimes, describing more precisely the empirical CHF. According to the hazard definition, this indicates that when a devices has survive a long period the probability of failing per unit of time decrease considerably to values close to 0. The devices that present this behaviour (G 1 , G 2 and G 3 ) are affected by failures which in some way may be controlled by the network operator, i.e., if one of those devices have survived for a very long time, may imply that the threats have been controlled. We may say that for these kind of devices, the longer the survival time, the bigger the probability of having optimal operational conditions. On the other hand, Figure 11 shows the typical behaviour observed when a CHF-fit is performed for uptimes on links that interconnect far located cities (G 4 ). In this case, the gamma-fit shows a CHF with a more moderate increase rate than the Weibull-fit for short uptimes and gradually converge to a constant increase rate (dH g (t) / dt → C), describing more precisely the empirical behaviour of this kind of links. This indicates that when those devices have survived a long period the probability of failing per unit of time is not reduced but gets fixed in a constant value. We may say that for long distance links a long survival time imply just partial optimal operational conditions while there are some remaining threats out of the control of the operators. The presented CHF figures not only illustrate better the results observed in Figures 7 and 8 , but also help to get a physical interpretation of the behaviour of uptimes, given that the theoretical differences of the Weibull and the gamma distribution are directly highlighted. 
Downtime fitting
For the case of downtimes distributions, we observe different stochastic behaviours depending on the kind of device and its geographical location. Common to all of them is that they can not be fitted to any simple type of parameterised distribution. Figure 12 illustrates this issue for downtimes on link 21. After analysing the obtained downtimes, we notice that they are influenced by different processes that affect their stochastic properties. For the case of short downtimes, we conclude that synchronisation problems have a huge impact. They are usually solved in a short period. On the other hand, when long downtimes exist, may be needed repair procedures that UNINETT organises according to priorities depending on the impact of the failure and the availability of human and physical resources.
Concluding remarks
This paper yields an improved insight into the failure characteristics at a real operational core network. First, a classification based on the types of threats that may affect the devices was made. The differences and similarities among the defined groups were analysed through the evaluation of the expected number of failures and the expected unavailability. It was found that the most unreliable kind of devices are the links that interconnect far located places, both in unavailability and number of failures. Three different orders of magnitudes were observed for unavailability values. First, the routers and short distance links which present cumulative downtimes in the order of minutes, then the medium distance links with values in the order of hours, and finally, the long distance links where the total cumulative downtime in the observation period may be specified in days. When the mean uptime and the mean downtime are plotted against the physical distance of the link a decreasing and an increasing trend was detected, respectively. That means that the better average availability in shorter links (worse in longer links) is due to both, failure and repair processes. A very interesting observation is the fact that routers and short distance links present similar dependability features, making very unprecise the assumption made in some related works where routers are assumed to be failure free, considering only failures on links.
For some UNINETT devices, we confirm the findings of some previous works where the Weibull distribution seems to be a good option in order to model failure processes of network components. Nevertheless, this assumption seems to be not valid for the case of links that cover long distances where the gamma distribution is a better option. This shows that when long distance links have survive a long period, the probability of failing per unit of time does not decrease monotonically to zero but after some survival time this probability get fixed in a constant value. On the other hand, for short and medium distance links, the longer the survival time, the bigger the probability of having optimal operational conditions. This work shows specific values that clearly describe the distributions that may fit uptimes of operational devices from a real network where the obtained shape parameters for long distance links suggest a high burstiness on the failure processes. Additionally, the provided values do not have any kind of normalisation, therefore, this information may be used in future dependability studies.
For the case of downtimes at the UNINETT network, we could not find any simple type of parameterised distribution that fits successfully their empirical behaviour. The repair procedures at the UNINETT network are organised according to priorities depending on the impact of the failure as well as according to the availability of human and physical resources needed for the reparation, which affects the stochastic properties of those processes.
